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Abstract. If women marry younger than men, increased population growth causes a sur-
plus of women in the marriage market. This paper introduces search frictions into a matching
model with transferable utility and age-dependent match payos to study if this so-called
marriage squeeze has caused a dowry \in
ation" in India. Using data from Karnataka it is
shown that the observed shifts in the age distributions and sex ratio of unmarried men and
women during the marriage squeeze lead to higher dowries conditional on the partners' ages.
A GMM estimate of the model parameters suggests that average dowries have increased as
well. (JEL C78, J12, O18)
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helpful comments. Vijayendra Rao generously gave me access to the NCAER data.Marriage patterns in India have changed substantially in the course of the 20th century.
The mean marriage age of women has risen from 13 years in 1911 to 19 years in 1991,
while that of men increased by four years during the same period, reducing the average
age dierence between husband and wife from seven to under ve years. This change has
been attributed to the so-called \marriage squeeze": when women marry younger than men,
higher population growth (higher birth rates and declining child mortality) leads to a surplus
of women in the marriage market. To resolve this surplus, the age gap at marriage must
decline.
A common theory argues that the marriage squeeze in India is responsible for the \in
a-
tion" in dowries, the marriage payments from the bride's family to the groom's: the squeeze
causes a scarcity of husbands which pushes up the price of marriage for women (Caldwell
et al. (1983); Bhat and Halli (1999); for an early discussion of the marriage squeeze in Eco-
nomics and an application to Sweden see Bergstrom and Lam (1989a,b)). High dowries
make raising a daughter a considerable nancial burden, and they have accordingly been
blamed for infanticide and neglect of female children, sex selective abortion, and mistreat-
ment of newly married women in attempts to extract more money from their parents (see
e.g. Prasad (1994), Sev'er (2008)). The \monster of modern dowry"(Srinivas (1984)) persists
despite state-level bans as early as 1939 and the national Dowry Prohibition Act from 1961.1
Anderson (2007b) uses a typical (frictionless) matching model with transfers and age
preferences to study the eects of a marriage squeeze caused by a one-time population
shock. She shows that any change in the marriage age gap must here be accompanied
1For an account of the diculties to resist participating in dowry, see Kishwar (2006). She
writes that her \stand [to boycott dowry] was viewed with respect, even appreciation. But it
did not lead anyone (except my two brothers) to refrain from taking (or giving) dowry, even
thought some were apologetic about their compulsions" (p.268/9). Caplan (1984) observes
that dowry prohibition had no eect except to make sure that \the custom remains out of
sight and in the realm of partial secrecy" (p.219). Billig (1992) notes that\the overwhelming
opinion" about dowry was \that it is something that the parents of a girl (...) are forced to
do in spite of the economic hardship that it entails" (p.210).
1by falling dowries: women will be willing to delay marriage, and marry at a smaller age
dierence, only if they have to pay less in return. However, marriage age cannot change in
this model in response to a permanent rise in the number of men and women, as would be
caused for example by higher population growth. Instead, dowries must increase to the point
where women are indierent between marrying and remaining single, and the supernumerary
women in every generation remain unmarried. In other words, the frictionless marriage model
fully places the adjustment burden on prices, leading only to higher rates of spinsterhood.2
Yet the Indian census documents that marriage rates in India are virtually unchanged since
the early 20th century, while the marriage age gap has fallen substantially. An analysis of
the eect of increased population growth on the marriage market must therefore account for
the decreasing marriage age gap.
This paper builds a two-sided search model to reexamine the eects of the marriage
squeeze on marriage ages and dowries. The framework captures some key features of the
marriage market: the numbers of unmarried men and women at each age depend on demo-
graphic parameters, and market participants have preferences over age and become older
during their search for a partner. Utility is transferable, so that the marriage surplus can
be redistributed via a dowry payment. The presence of frictions means that a tight market
increases both the duration of search and the threat of becoming too old before nding a
partner. Demographic pressure can therefore raise willingness to pay while at the same time
drawing out the search process and increasing average marriage age.3
2See (Sautmann (2010) for a detailed argument. The intuition is that population growth
causes a surplus of women in every generation. For each woman who marries later than
optimal, there is always another woman at the ideal age available, and this cannot be a
stable outcome.
3It should be noted that the approach taken here is not directly comparable with the
frictionless model. In Anderson (2007b), the one-time population shock as well as the dowry
function are part of the same equilibrium. By contrast, I will compare (constant) marriage
behavior and dowries between steady-state equilibria for dierent demographic parameters.
2It will be shown that the model can accommodate marriage age change and dowry in
ation
at once. Specically, starting from one steady state, raising the rate of growth in the number
of births can lead to a new steady state with higher average dowry and a smaller age gap.
This eect need not be driven by marriage strategies: even if, for example, women are willing
to marry earlier in the new steady state, the scarcity of husbands can cause their search to
last longer and their marriage age to rise.
Based on the model I can compare dowry and marriage ages between dierent equilibria.
Since there is now a stochastic element to the matching process, two aspects of dowry in
ation
must be distinguished, namely, increases in payments conditional on the age of the partners
and increases in average payments. The latter is a good measure of the strain imposed by high
dowries if households are e.g. subject to liquidity constraints, but it cannot separate changes
in match-specic transfers from changes in what matches are observed. The former more
accurately captures the true \price" change by looking at matches of a given quality (i.e. at
given ages). Using census data for the Indian state of Mysore (today Karnataka) from before
and after the marriage squeeze, along with marriage data from the National Family Health
Survey, I demonstrate that the observed changes in the age distributions imply increases in
dowries conditional on partners' ages, caused by a relative drop in the value of search for
women. In addition, a GMM estimation of the marriage payo function in this model shows
that demographic growth did have an in
ating eect on average marriage transfers, and at
the same time led to a decrease in the age gap at marriage. A key assumption for these
comparisons is that the underlying marriage age preferences have not substantially changed
during the marriage squeeze, and in section 4.1 I argue that many of the potential drivers
of marriage age preferences { in particular fertility, education levels, and economic growth {
have been relatively stable up to the end of the squeeze in the 1970s.
The next section gives a detailed account of the literature on marriage squeeze and dowry
in
ation. Section 2 describes the model and denes the equilibrium. Three examples pro-
vide intuition for the forces that drive changes to dowries and average marriage ages, and
show that a shrinking age gap and rising dowries can occur together (section 3). Section 4
compares conditional dowries between equilibria with dierent equilibrium age distributions,
3Figure 1. Population growth rate in India () and Karnataka ( ), data from
Sekher et al. (2001), Census of India.
and then applies the comparative statics results to the actual demographic changes in Kar-
nataka. Section 5 describes the estimation strategy for average dowries and marriage ages
and presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
1. Marriage Squeeze and Dowry Inflation
Population Growth and Marriage Squeeze. A marriage squeeze is the result of an acceler-
ation of population growth. Figure 1 depicts the decadal population growth rate in India and
in Karnataka from 1901 to 2001 at the midpoints between census years (1901, 1911, etc.).
After a period of famine, population growth picked up for the rst time in 1901-11 (Dyson
et al. (2004), p.22). The country experienced terrible losses from the in
uenza epidemic in
1918 (ibid.), leading to a population decrease in 1911-21, but in the next few decades the
growth rate reached over 10% and eventually sped up to nearly 25% in 1961-81. Fertility
declines nally reversed the trend in the 1980s. Correspondingly, 1920-1980 can be thought
of as the main period of the marriage squeeze, with the greatest shifts in the marriage market
probably between the 1930s and 1960s.
Even though families universally complained about a growing scarcity of grooms and
strong competition among girls (e.g. Epstein (1973), Caplan (1984), Bloch and Rao (2002)),
4the existence of a marriage squeeze was initially doubted, because India had an overall
shortage of women for much of the last century. Unlike in most other parts of the world,
the male-female sex ratio in South Asia exceeds one due to higher female mortality than
elsewhere (Amartya Sen's \missing women", see also Coale (1991) and Visaria (1969)).
However, conditions in the marriage market depend on the ratio of men and women at
the relevant ages who are actually available for marriage. If there is high population growth
and women marry at younger ages, the sex ratio at marriage age can still favor men. Several
studies in India found that there were in fact more women than men at prime marriage age in
the areas under scrutiny (Caldwell et al. (1983), Billig (1991), Rao (1993)). With reference
to India's demographics today, Tertilt and Neelakantan (2008) calculate that a population
growth rate of 1.43% \adds" 14 women to the overall sex ratio of 95 women per 100 men
(assuming ve years age dierence at marriage). Holding marriage age xed, it can be shown
that the sex ratio of single men and women in India rapidly deteriorated during the 20th
century. Bhat and Halli (1999) calculate an adjusted sex ratio index at the ages at which
men and women used to marry in 1911 and show that it dropped from 100 in 1911 to a low
of 53.4 men per 100 women in 1971.4
The marriage squeeze is directly linked with the age dierence at marriage. A surplus of
women caused by demographic growth can only be accommodated if the age gap shrinks;
otherwise some women must remain unmarried. In other words, the marriage squeeze origi-
nates in a preference for a positive age dierence at marriage, but to resolve the surplus of
women the marriage age gap must fall. Conversely, if there is nonzero population growth
the age gap at marriage can decrease without a change in marriage rates only if the growth
rate accelerates, so that consecutive age cohorts become larger. Table 1 assembles dierent
estimates of the average marriage ages for India and Karnataka, along with the percentage
of never married men and women at ages 45-54. It shows that the proportion of women
4They do account for the possibility of widower remarriage, which makes the squeeze
more pronounced.
5Table 1. Marriage Squeeze Indicators.
Mean age at marriage and average age gap % never married
India (1) Mysore/Karnataka (2) Karnataka (3) India (4)
men women gap men women gap men women gap men women
1911 19.8 12.9 6.9 24.24 15.21 [9.03] 4.2 0.9
1921 20.2 13.3 6.9 24.92 15.22 [9.70] [22.98] 14.47 8.51 4.1 1.1
1931 19.0 12.9 6.1 23.83 14.55 [9.28] 3.8 0.8
1951 20.6 15.2 5.4 25.48 16.20 [9.28] 3.7 1.2
1961 21.6 15.9 5.7 24.40 16.32 [8.08] 3.3 0.5
1971 22.4 17.2 5.2 25.24 17.79 [7.45] 2.6 0.5
1981 23.3 18.3 5.0 25.88 19.20 [6.68] [25.04] 18.45 6.59 2.2 0.5
1991 23.8 19.0 4.8 26.22 20.15 [6.07] 2.5 0.7
(1), (4): Bhat and Halli (1999), table 3; singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) and unmarried
at ages 45-54. (2) Agarwala (1957), table 3, synthetic census cohorts (1911-51), Mysore; Sekher
et al. (2001), table 7 (1961-91). (3) Banerjee (1998), table 5, SMAM, geographic equivalent of
today's Karnataka. { Values in square brackets calculated. 1941 marriage data not collected due
to WWII.
who remained permanently unmarried was stable over time, but the average age dierence
between husband and wife at rst marriage fell by about two years.5
Dowry and Dowry In
ation. Dowry in India today is an almost universal phenomenon
(93-94% of marriages, Anderson (2007a)), with payments often well above the typical an-
nual income (ibid., Zachariah (1984), Kodoth (2008)), despite the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Anthropological and ethnographic research reports that individual payments have greatly in-
creased6, and what was originally an exclusive practice of high castes in the North gradually
spread to the whole country and replaced the former dominant custom of brideprice (Caplan
5As an aside, note that the unusually high initial age gap at marriage for India is pre-
sumably only possible because India actually had and has \missing women" { otherwise the
younger cohorts would be too large for all women to marry.
6Many of these accounts are anecdotal in nature. For example, Billig (1992) quotes a
\prosperous Syrian Christian man in his mid-50's" from Kerala, who says that when he
6(1984), Srinivas (1984), Billig (1991, 1992), Menski (1998), Palriwala (2006), Sharma (2006),
Guttentag and Secord (1983), Singh (2004), Bhat and Halli (1999), Caldwell et al. (1983);
see last two for further sources). Caldwell et al. (1983) chronicle this progress in Karnataka,
starting in Madras in the 1930s, with the rst dowries paid in their rural study area in 1965.
The same authors also document the great importance of a girl's early marriage for a
family's social status. Families' \overwhelming fear is that no husband may be found" if a
girl is still unmarried at 19 or 20 (p. 351). Along with others they emphasize the age of the
bride as a factor for the dowry (Kodoth (2008), Zachariah (1984)).
Many theories ultimately attribute the in
ation of dowries to economic growth and rising
wealth. The availability of men with higher and more stable incomes, the push to \marry up"
by newly auent members of low castes, or the increasing willingness and ability to pay for
status by emulating customs of higher castes (\Sanskritization") may have in
ated the prices
of husbands (Rajaraman (2006), Anderson (2003), Srinivas (1952)). Dowries may also serve
as a form of pre-mortem bequest which rises with the wealth of the father, given that women
until recently had no inheritance rights (Botticini and Siow (2003), Zhang and Chan (1999),
Goody (1973), see e.g. Sharma (2006) on women's property rights). However, while these
causes certainly play a role, they cannot fully explain the time frame and geographic spread
of dowry in
ation across India. The bequest interpretation is at odds with the fact that the
bride has often little control over her dowry and that the part traditionally considered hers,
the stridhana, did not change over time (Bhat and Halli (1999)).7 Hypergamy (marrying into
a higher caste) is common in the North, but South India is isogamous (Srinivas (1984)).8 But
most importantly, India's per capita national income was stagnant (or possibly even falling)
between 1910 and 1959, with moderate growth only from 1960 on (Sivasubramonian (2000),
was young \a doctor would cost about 20000 rupees", but would now be more than 800000
rupees (about $48000).
7The dowry is also often not given willingly. Bloch and Rao (2002) put it bluntly when
they describe dowry violence as a \bargaining instrument". Zachariah (1984) observes that
7% of marriages in his sample were delayed because of insucient payment.
8Srinivas makes the direct link with dowry, stating that \in the isogamous South, modern
dowry is really a totally new development."
7Maddison (1983)). Yet the existing evidence seems to indicate that the increase in (net)
dowries started around 1920 and leveled out around the time economic growth began. In
Rao's (1993) study in Karnataka, dowries are signicantly correlated with year of marriage,
and after controlling for partners' characteristics and market conditions, dowries increase on
average by |258 annually over the 55 years from 1923 to 1978, with most of the gain before
1950 (Edlund (2006)). Paul (1986) nds a more than twentyfold increase in real dowry
among families in Delhi from 1920 to 1969, but from 1970-79 onwards, dowries began to fall
in real terms, even though the nominal amounts tripled. This pattern coincides with the
time frame of the marriage squeeze.
Logan and Arunachalam (2008) challenge the marriage squeeze hypothesis from a dierent
angle. They argue that the perception of systematically increasing dowries in South Asia
may be mistaken: using two data sets from India they nd no upwards time trend in dowries.
One of the data sets covers a period when demographic pressure already began to ease, from
1970 to 1994. However, they also re-analyze the Rao (1993) data set and nd no trend.
It is therefore possible that there was no average increase in dowries, and that husbands'
prices rose only conditional on quality, or perhaps that the in
ation of dowries was purely
subjective. Another reason for the contradiction may be the diculty of measuring dowry
payments and consequently of interpreting the data. A data set from Karnataka collected
by the National Council of Applied Economic Research under the supervision of Sonalde
Desai and Vijayendra Rao exemplies this. Dowries were measured as the real net value of
all transfers and gifts related to the marriage. Out of a sample of 601, only for 375 a dowry
sum could be calculated, and only in 33 cases husband and wife agree on it. The average net
dowry was |16,515, but wives claim to have paid on average over |16,000 more than what
husbands say they received. At the same time, recorded payments vary between -800,000
and over 3 million rupees.
This illustrates a general problem: eliciting accurate sums for a large sample size is very
dicult, not only because dowries are illegal, but also because they are often given in kind
and in several installments, intermingled with gifts and other transfers, and the data must be
collected retrospectively. Even though most researchers agree that dowries have increased,
8the existing quantitative evidence is thus not entirely conclusive. This paper studies the
connection between demographics and dowries, but in doing so it also contributes to the
larger question of whether dowry in
ation has actually taken place.
2. The Search Model and Marriage Market Equilibrium
The marriage market model I propose is a search model with transferable utility. Search
frictions have important implications for the eects of a marriage squeeze, because they can
delay of marriage for women when increased demographic growth reduces the relative num-
ber of unmarried men. Transferable utility means that match surplus can be redistributed
through payments at marriage, the dowry. The model assumes that men and women, or
perhaps more accurately, families with a son or daughter at marriageable age, each search
for a partner. They meet according to a probability distribution and then decide if they
want to get married. A couple will marry whenever their joint surplus is greater than the
sum of their outside options, and the outside options are given by the prospect of meeting
another partner at a later date.
In a steady state, the distribution of singles at dierent ages, and therefore the meeting
probabilities that determine the outside options of all market participants, are constant in
every period. The age composition of the unmarried population is modeled as the explicit
result of entry by young cohorts, and of exit from marriage and mortality, where the growth
rate of births, birth sex ratios, and mortality rates are exogenous parameters.9
Unlike in most search models, where heterogeneity comes from a characteristic that has a
population distribution, the marriage payo, and consequently the agent's outside options,
is assumed to depend on age, and can therefore change over time for the individual market
participant. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Coles and Masters (2000) introduced a simi-
lar kind of \aging" into search in the context of labor markets, by assuming that unemployed
workers gradually lose skills. The age-dependence of the marriage payo function can be
thought of as a summary of the couple's and their families' preferences over age at marriage,
9In labor market search models, a steady state in the market distribution of workers and
jobs is usually achieved by assuming entry through exogenous match dissolution rates.
9bringing together an array of motives from fertility and health concerns to labor market
status and the parents' retirement plans. It is of course a simplication to assume that
marriage payos depend only on the age of the partners, but age preferences can perhaps be
thought of as \orthogonal" to preferences over other (time-invariant) characteristics. The
market described here could then be seen as the outcome of many stratied submarkets, each
re
ecting assortative matching according to characteristics like wealth and beauty. Within
those submarkets, individuals will only take their own and their partner's age into account.
2.1. Population Development in Steady-State
As a rst step in building the model I derive the age distributions of unmarried men and
women, or the singles distribution for short, starting from absolute population numbers. It
will be shown that the age distribution of singles can attain a steady state, even though
absolute numbers are subject to change in a world with population growth. Let i = 1;:::;I
be the age of women, and j = 1;:::;J that of men in the marriage market. Age one is
normalized as the rst period after entry into the marriage market. For convenience, we will
allow for an age gap at market entry, denoted by a: if the market entry age is for example
ten years for women, but fourteen for men, and the time period is a year, a equals four.
The size of the female population at time t is Wt, and Wi;t the measure of women at age
i, with the equivalent Mt and Mj;t for men. Let s = (s2;:::;sI) denote the survival rates for
the female population, so that si describes the proportion of women at i   1 who are still
alive at i. The transition rates of the male population are z = (z2;:::;zJ). The number of
men and women born grows at rate g between two consecutive birth cohorts. Assuming that
survival up to entering the marriage market is constant, this implies W1;t+1 = (1+g)W1;t and
Mi;t+1 = (1 + g)M1;t. Note that I am not modeling the source of the increase in cohort size.
The interaction of mortality changes and fertility decisions as determinants of the overall rate
of population growth is fairly complex; for example, a sustained decline in infant mortality
can lead to a more rapid increase in the size of consecutive cohorts at entry into the marriage
10market, but may induce a lower fertility rate in response. I summarize these factors simply
as an exogenous change in g.10
Couples meet once every period and decide to marry based on the payos from their
partnership versus the outside options that both of them have. Marriage decisions are
















Upon meeting, a woman of age i and a man of age j choose to marry with probability
ij 2 [0;1]. If they are indierent between marrying and not marrying, ij may lie strictly
between 0 and 1. Each ij also describes the proportion of (i;j) couples who marry. Married
couples leave the market for good.
A single woman of age i and a single man of age j meet according to a probability
distribution which depends on the current numbers of single men and women at all ages in
the market. In fact, I assume that it depends on relative numbers only, namely the singles
distribution dt = (wt;mt;rt). The scalar rt is the singles sex ratio Mt
Wt. The vectors wt and
mt describe the age distributions for men and women, with wit and mjt as the proportion of
age-i women in the female population and age-j men in the male population, respectively.
10Ideally, population growth would be endogenous to the model since fertility likely de-
pends on marriage age. However, the eect of an \involuntary" change in marriage age (due
to adverse conditions in the marriage market) on fertility choices is likely complex and seems
not well-studied (but see Dommaraju (2008)). At the same time, assume that there is a
more comprehensive model in which higher population growth from lower mortality aects
marriage age, which then feeds back into fertility and thus population growth: any two equi-
libria in this model with an (endogenously) low growth rate before the change and a high
growth rate after will coincide with two equilibria in the present model in which g is chosen
as exogenously either low or high.
11The functions Pij(d) and Qji(d) describe the probability of an age-i woman meeting an
age-j man and that of an age-j man meeting an age-i woman, respectively, given a singles
distribution d. It must hold that
PI
i=1 Qji  1 and
PJ
j=1 Pij  1.
2.2. From Absolute to Relative Demographics
The singles distribution dt, the variable which determines the meeting probabilities and
therefore governs search frictions, can under certain conditions attain a steady state. Sup-
pose for the moment that individual marriage strategies are xed. Starting from absolute
numbers, we would like to take the birth sex ratio within a cohort, b, the growth rate of
births g, transition vectors s and z, and the age gap a as given, and nd a singles distri-
bution that replicates itself in every period. In what follows all expressions are derived for
the women's side of the market, and the equivalent expression for the men's side is stated
without derivations.








This is the proportion of women at age i in t who do not marry, multiplied by the survival
rate; in other words, these are the women who are still in the market in t + 1, now at age
i + 1. Equivalently, the staying rate for men at age j is








The number of single women at each age in period t, Wi;t, can now be expressed in terms of
the Wi;t 1, and iterating over t produces the vector of female populations at ages 1;:::;I:
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12From here on, applying the iteration further will only change the time indices on the 'i



















































for i = 2;:::I. A steady state of the singles distribution is characterized by a constant vector














(1+g)w1 for wi yields
w1 = 











; and similarly (2.3)
m1 = 	












With stable population growth g, the relative sizes of age-1 cohorts at any given time are
determined by the age dierence a at entering the marriage market, survival rates until entry,
and the sex ratio at birth.11 Letting z0 and s0 be the survival rates from birth to market
11Observe that the ratio at birth refers to boys and girls born in the same year, while the
index t refers to men and women entering the market in the same period. The age dierence
implies that these men and women are from dierent birth years.




(1+g)a, and the singles sex ratio can











The steady-state singles distribution d is thus fully described by equations (2.1)-(2.4).
The following observations are simple, but useful for a better understanding of the age
structure of the marriage market in steady state. First, note that with g  0 each consecutive
age group has a lower share in the overall population, since wi  wi+1. The inequality is
strict if there is positive population growth. With only two age groups, for instance, the
younger women are always in the majority. The most \equal" distribution is theoretically
possible if g = 0 and w1 = wi = 1
I, but this requires that no woman marries. This holds of




w1 . The basis for the singles sex ratio, namely the total population of men
and women at marriageable age, is determined by exogenous demographic parameters, that
is by population growth and mortality. Beyond that, a higher proportion of age-1 grooms
means that men leave the marriage market faster. Similarly, a low w1 means women marry
\late". Both factors will push the single sex ratio down, towards a surplus of women.
2.3. Restrictions on P and Q and a Word on Market Congestion
The random component to the search process, described by the meeting probability func-
tions P and Q, can be seen as a black box capturing any restrictions on age targeting, from
actual \physical" restrictions to social norms surrounding marriage. To give some examples,
practically all marriages in India in the time period of interest were initiated and negotiated
by family members, and young girls were kept in the house after puberty, so that age is not
fully observable. Matchmakers or parents may also rst propose the oldest son or daughter
to an approaching family before discussing other possible matches. More generally, conven-
tions may require a family to go through the motions and give each potential match full
consideration even if there is no real interest, slowing the search process down.12
12Caldwell et al. (1983) report for instance that \[t]raditionally, marriages to relatives
have been preferred, and to a very considerable extent the parents (...) could insist on such
14So far I have made no assumptions on the actual shape of the meeting probabilities. Since
there is a continuum of people at each age, the probability of meeting must be equal to the
proportions of men and women who meet. Each man or woman can meet only one person
at a time, so the mass of women of age i who meet age-j men, PijWit, must equal QjiMjt,
the mass of age-j men meeting age-i women. At the same time, using the relations between
absolute and relative population numbers, PijWit = Pij
wi
rmjMjt, so that Qji = Pij
wi
rmj.
Beyond this condition, we may want to impose further restrictions on the eect of d
onto P and Q. As a rst simplication I assume that P and Q are separable in r and
(w;m). Then Pij can be rewritten as the product w(r)  pij(w;m) with
PJ
j=1 pij = 1.
The function w sets the \speed" of the marriage market for women { the average rate at
which they meet men { whereas pij describes the probability that the man is of a certain









j=1 QjiMjt = m(r)Mt; or w(r) = rm(r),
so that qji =
wi
mjpij. The response of the -functions to r re
ects the \congestion" in the
market due to an unbalanced sex ratio. Plausibly w is increasing in r and m is decreasing,
so that the overall meeting probability for women rises with the relative number of men
and vice versa. The  must be bounded by [0;1]. \Symmetric" congestion would arise, for
example, if w =  1
m =
p
r (within these bounds).
In addition I will assume that pij and qji are independent of w and m, respectively, so
that there are no \relative competition" eects between age groups on the same side of the
market (e.g. a larger proportion of young women does not reduce the meeting rates of an
a marriage taking place", but that there was increasing \temptation for the boy's parents
to seek a marriage outside the family". In addition, age is but one of many important
characteristics to consider in a marriage. The families' caste, status and wealth, previous
relations between them, the partners' health and education, and, last but not least, astrology
all play a role. One can think of a variation of the model with an idiosyncratic error term
to the match surplus, which is realized only upon meeting. If this error has a large enough
variance, no age will be a priori excluded from consideration. The main conclusions of the
model remain the same.
15older woman if r is the same). Note that this implies pij = mj and qji = wi. This assumption
is attractive both for its convenience and because it implies that the age of the man (woman)
an individual meets is a simple random draw from the male (female) age distribution.
The specic assumptions of separability and pure random sampling are not necessary for
many of the results that follow, but they will be used in the estimation in section 5 and
warrant a brief discussion of the restrictions they impose. Under separability the eect of r
on the meeting rates  can be interpreted as the \pure" congestion eect in the model. The
\composition" eect is seen best when letting w(r) = minf1;rg and m(r) = minf1;1=rg,
so that the short side of the market has a meeting probability of one, and the meeting rate
decreases one-to-one in the singles sex ratio for the other side. Suppose r > 1, so that
the women's meeting rates are constant (w = 1) , and consider the change in meeting
probabilities when the male population above the median age jmed doubles. The \pure"
congestion eect implies that each man will be less likely to meet a woman of any age
group in a given time period. But while women's overall meeting rates stay the same, the
\composition" eect means that the probability of meeting a man younger than jmed will
shrink from one half to one third, even though there are the same numbers of young men
and of women in the market as before. In other words, the older men crowd out some of the
encounters between young men and women. This eect is at play whenever the meeting rate
changes by less than r (or 1
r), and this must be the case for at least one side of the market.
The composition eect may seem somewhat counterintuitive at rst. But suppose the
crowding out eect of old on young men in the example above can be reduced by choosing
dierent P and Q. Doing so is implicitly based on the assumption that women would prefer
to meet younger men. However, while the payos to marriage  are xed, actual preferences
over marriage ages are endogenous to the model; for instance, even vastly dierent ages may
want to marry if \the price is right". More generally, letting meeting probabilities depend on
age preferences would in eect allow individuals to target their search towards partners of a
16specic (preferred) age, thereby indirectly reducing search frictions.13 Yet the main argument
of this paper is that the search process in this market is not free of frictions and that there
are some barriers to age targeting. Moreover, the frictionless model has implications for the
eect of a marriage squeeze that contradict the data from India. Thus, while the precise
distributional assumptions for P and Q might be debated, search frictions and the associated
congestion eects seem a good approximation of the realities of the marriage market.
2.4. The Value Functions
Let us turn to marriage decisions. In the derivation of the steady-state singles distribution,
we took the marriage indicator matrix A as given, but in equilibrium it is of course the result
of the market participants' individual choices. Upon meeting, men and women compare the
payo to marrying with the outside value of being single and remaining in the market.
This section derives the value functions that describe the individuals' outside options and
determine their choice to marry. It focuses again on the women's side of the market, stating
the equivalent expressions for the mens' side without derivations.
Omitting time indices, summarize by b(i;j) and g(i;j) the (expected) discounted future
payos of marriage for a bride and a groom at age i and j, respectively, and let Dij be the
dowry paid by the bride's to the groom's family. A couple will marry upon meeting if they
both prefer marrying each other over continuing search. The woman agrees to marry if the net
payo b(i;j) Dij exceeds the expected value of remaining single, (si+1Bi+1+(1 si+1)H),
where  is the discount factor, Bi+1 is the value of search at i+1, and H is the payo when
not surviving to the next age. H = 0 on the assumption that death is independent of the
marriage decision and men and women compare the additional value of marriage to the
outside option of being single (so that all payos are understood as relative payos from
marriage). Equivalently, the man compares his outside option zj+1Gj+1 with g(i;j)+Dij.
13Note also that targeted search by age implies that any variation in partners' marriage
age is a choice. Every individual at a certain age must then marry exactly one age group,
or be indierent between all ages married, unless there is additional taste variation.
17The expected dowry payment is assumed to be the outcome of a generalized Nash bar-
gaining problem, given by
Dij = argmax
D
[b(i;j)   D   si+1Bi+1]
 [g(i;j) + D   zj+1Gj+1]
(1 )
where  describes the woman's bargaining power.This means that the dowry is
Dij = (1   )(b(i;j)   si+1Bi+1)   (g(i;j)   zj+1Gj+1);
and the net payo to the woman from marrying is therefore
si+1Bi+1 + (b(i;j)   si+1Bi+1 + g(i;j)   zj+1Gj+1):
She receives her outside option, plus a share  of the net marriage surplus. As long as this
share is positive, she will agree to marry. Similarly, the groom receives his outside option
plus a (1   ) share of the net surplus, and will want to marry whenever the net surplus
is positive. This implies that the marriage decisions of a couple (i;j) coincide and can be
described by a single function  indicating a positive net surplus.
Another way of saying this is that I assume that a couple will marry whenever their net
surplus of marriage is nonnegative. The transfers at marriage have to be such that both
partners prefer marrying to their outside option. If the marriage surplus is strictly positive,
a set of prices { any  between 0 and 1 { satisfy this condition. The choice of an exogenous,
xed  serves to pin the transfer payment down.14 The endogenous element of the partners'
relative bargaining power is given by the value functions, which re
ect market conditions.
The expected value of search Bi for a woman at age i is given by the maximized expected
value of meeting with men of ages j = 1;:::;J according to the singles distribution and
the meeting probability functions. For the value function (although not the dowry) it is not
important who receives which share of the marriage surplus, so we can summarize b(i;j)+
g(i;j) = (i;j). Letting S(i;j) = (i;j)   si+1Bi+1   zj+1Gj+1, this can be written
14A strictly positive surplus in a market with many identical agents is possible because
search frictions prevent direct competition, as in the classical job search model.
18recursively as




where S(i;j) = [(i;j)   si+1Bi+1   zj+1Gj+1] is the net surplus at marriage for i and j.
Equivalently,
(2.7) Gj = zj+1Gj+1 +
I X
i=1
Qji(1   )maxf0; S(i;j)g;
Let the outside options at the nal age of market participation be BI+1 = GJ+1 = 0, re-
spectively. The individually maximizing marriage strategy for couple (i;j) that is embedded
in the value functions is described by the marriage market indicator ij. Finally, observe
that the value of search for the bride is bounded by 0 and  B = 1 I
1  max(i;j) (i;j) (with
the equivalent expressions for G).
Note that the age of entering or leaving the market and the lowest and highest age at
which an individual may get married need in principle not coincide in equilibrium: the age
distribution may capture people who \clutter" the market and attempt to meet a partner,
without ultimately marrying anyone. This implies that the value function may be increasing
in age over some range.
Now we are in a position to dene the marriage market equilibrium.
Denition 2.1 (Marriage Market Equilibrium). For a given payo function  and parame-
ters , s, z, b, s0 and a, an equilibrium consists of an indicator matrix A, value functions B
and G, and singles distributions m and w such that
a)For all (i;j), ij = 0 if S(i;j) < 0, ij = 1 if S(i;j) > 0, and  2 [0;1] if S(i;j) = 0.
b) m and w are steady-state distributions for  satisfying equations (2.1)-(2.4), and
c) Bi and Gj are the value functions arising from m and w according to (2.6)-(2.7),
with end point conditions BI+1 = B and GJ+1 = G.
In a steady-state equilibrium, individuals' decisions based on m and w coincide with the
marriage indicator matrix that produces those same steady-state singles distributions. Men
and women's expectations about meeting probabilities later in life are correct and identical
to current market conditions.
19Conrming existence of a matching equilibrium is an application of Kakutani's xed point
theorem. We can dene a map from the set of possible d and A into itself. The new singles
distribution is given by equations (2.1)-(2.4). The new A is derived from a set of new value
functions for d; since the singles distribution determines the meeting probabilities P and Q,
it can be shown that the mapping given by equations (2.6) and (2.7) is a contraction, and
therefore has the two value functions B and G as its unique xed point.
Lemma 2.2 (Value Function). Suppose m and w are given and the eective discount factors
si and zj are less than one for all i and j. Then the corresponding value functions B and
G exist and are unique.
It is then straightforward to verify that this map satises the conditions for Kakutani's
theorem and that its xed point is a marriage market equilibrium.
Theorem 2.3 (Existence of Equilibrium). If the eective discount factors are less than one
there exists a matching market equilibrium.
Note, however, that the equilibrium as a whole need not be unique. I will return to this
issue in section 4.
3. Examples
The following examples show that the model can simultaneously explain the observed
changes in marriage age patterns and dowry in
ation as the result of demographic change.
Demographics aect average marriage ages through the age distribution, the meeting
rates, and marriage choices. For example, suppose the singles sex ratio falls. Holding the
age distributions and marriage decisions xed, women's arrival rates of potential matching
partners decrease at every age, leading to marriage delay and an \older" age distribution for
women. But changes in one age distribution generally aect that on the other market side,
and ultimately outside options and marriage decisions, so that the matching sets will change,
leading to further shifts. For instance, men's matching sets \shifting up" to exclude younger
women and/or include older ones is equivalent to marriage postponement by women, and all
else equal this will again lead to higher average marriage age.
20The argument for dowries is similar: changes to the relative numbers of observed matches
will aect average dowries. However, it is not a priori clear which age combinations produce
high dowries and which produce low ones. In addition, changing outside options will also
alter the amount of dowry that is paid in any given match, because the dowry depends on
the partners' value of search (the conditional dowry change, see section 4). The sum of
all these eects is quite complex. This section provides examples in which an increase in
population growth g leads to higher average dowries while also shrinking the marriage age
gap. Throughout we will assume that w = minf1;rg and m = minf1; 1
rg with  < 1.
3.1. Example 1: 2x2 Symmetric Case
Consider an example with just two age levels. For a small number of ages, the discrete
model is tractable enough to nd all pure-strategy equilibria by trial and error (by guessing
a set of 's, solving for the age distributions and value functions, and checking if the 
correspond to men's and women's optimal behavior). Note that a (2;2) couple will marry
whenever (2;2) > 0, and we will restrict attention to prot functions with this property.
The bride and groom contribute equally to the marriage payo, i.e. b(i;j) = g(i;j) =
1
2(i;j), and the Nash bargaining parameter  equals 0:5. Finally, assume that the age gap
at market entry is zero, and the birth sex ratio and survival rates equal one.
The value of being single at age 2 is, for the bride and groom
B2 = 0:521wm1((2;1)   G2) + 0:5w(1   m1)(2;2)
G2 = 0:512mw1((1;2)   B2) + 0:5m(1   w1)(2;2):
Optimal strategies imply that 11 = 1 whenever (B2 + G2) < (1;1) and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, 12 is one if B2 < (1;2), and 21 equals 1 whenever G2 < (2;1).
This version of the model is completely symmetric apart from the payo function at (1;2)
and (2;1). This means that w1 = m1 and r = 1 when 12 = 21. Suppose the payo function
is such that both 12 and 21 equal one. In this case, the value functions are identical for
both the bride and the groom, except for the dierence in the marriage payos for couples
with dierent ages. The two value function equations constitute a linear system, and it
is straightforward to show that B2 < G2 whenever (2;1) < (1;2). In other words, if
21the marriage of a young woman with an old man is preferred over the opposite pairing, a
woman's outside option at age 1 will generally be lower than that of a man. What is more,
the dierence G2   B2 is increasing in m1, meaning that if there are relatively more young
men (and therefore more young women, since w1 = m1) in the market, the women's relative




1(G2   B2) + 0:5m1(1   m1)G2   0:5m1(1   m1)B2 = 0:5m1(G2   B2):
Finally, it can be shown that m1 is strictly increasing in g; as the growth rate increases,
younger cohorts become relatively larger, and the average dowry goes up.15
In this example, both the eect of demographic change on the value functions and on the
probability weights work to increase the average dowry. Moreover, dowry in
ation occurs
even though strategies do not change at all. However, the increased number of young people
in the market means that the average marriage age for both men and women falls here as g
rises, and due to symmetry the average age gap at marriage is always zero. In Example 2
the predictions of the marriage squeeze hypothesis are fully borne out.
3.2. Example 2: Strategic marriage postponement
In this example, I show that the age gap change predicted by the marriage squeeze can
obtain when women \postpone" as g increases. Starting from an equilibrium in which the
couple (2;1) does not match, the marriage surplus between (2;1) turns positive as g increases,
and they begin to marry. The second, symmetric equilibrium is exactly that of Example 1.
Let  = 0:5, and let the payo function be given by (1;1) = 7, (1;2) = 4:2, (2;2) = 35,
(2;1) = 2:7. Suppose that g lies between  0:15 to 0:4; the marriage surplus for all couples
15Note that (1   m1) =
 1
1+gm1 (equation 2.2), where  1 = 1   (11w1 + 12(1   w1)).
Using that m1 = w1 and 12 = 1, we can solve directly for m1 for all possible 11. The
simplest case is 11 = 1: then  1 = 1   , and m1 =
1+g
2+g . This last equation illustrates
that  < 1 is needed for strict monotonicity of m1 in g. If all (1;1) couples meet and marry
( = 1, 11 = 1), no one will ever reach age 2, so that the outside options are independent
of g.
22Figure 2. An example with  = 0:5, (1;1) = 7, (1;2) = 4:2, (2;2) = 35,
(2;1) = 2:7. 21 = 0 left and 21 = 1right.
except (2;1) is then positive for every value of g. Omitting the algebra, gure 2 illustrates
the behavior of S(2;1) = (2;1)   G2 as g increases for both 21 = 0 and 21 = 1 (top
panel), and the corresponding changes in average dowry, women's age, and the age gap at
marriage. The marriage surplus of couple (2;1) is increasing in both cases, so that 21 = 0
can be an equilibrium only as long as g <  0:06. For 21 = 1, g > 0:35 leads to a pure
strategy equilibrium (so that S(2;1) > 0). The demographically driven switch between the
two equilibria leads simultaneously to an increase in dowries from a negative to a positive
average payment (i.e. a switch \from brideprice to dowry"), a rise in the women's average
marriage age, and a fall in the marriage age gap from more than 0.3 to 0.
23Table 2. Example 3
g -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 ... 0.05
Dowry -6.63 -6.52 0.29 6.33 ... 6.85
Women's marriage age 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.31 ... 1.48
Men's marriage age 5.40 5.35 5.00 5.00 ... 5.07
Age gap 4.35 4.34 4.00 3.69 ... 3.59
Matching set ...
3.3. Example 3: Value Functions and Probability Weights Trump Strategies
This 5-by-5 example shows that the eect of the growth rate on the equilibrium outcome
need not be driven by changing strategies. When there are more ages, the model can be
solved numerically to search for pure strategy equilibria. Assume that there are ve age
groups, and that the age gap at market entry a equals four. The payo function is given
by 20   (2   i)2   (2   j)2 (i.e. an inverted quadratic with a maximum at (2;2)). Following
typical demographic patterns, the birth sex ratio b was set to 1.04, survival rates are close
to one, and  = 0:99. Table 3.3 shows the evolution of the average dowry and marriage ages
for men and women for a series of population growth rates: From g = 0:01 on, dowry and
relative marriage ages change in the directions expected by the dowry in
ation/marriage
squeeze hypothesis. However, marriage decisions reveal marriage preponement by women
and marriage delay by men. The last row in the table shows the age combinations (with i
on the x-axis) who marry in equilibrium shaded in grey. Most  equal one, but at the outset
where g =  0:01, 15, 25 and 14 are zero, that is, young women do not marry very old
men; as g increases, those zeros disappear, and at g = 0:01 all couples marry. At g = 0:05,
51, 52, and 41 are zero. In other words, the matching sets of men exclude old women as g
grows, and include more young women. Nevertheless, the probability weights eect cancels
this out, and the average marriage age of women increases gradually. At the same time,
even though dowries at any g are highest between old women and young men (who cease
to marry as g progresses), and lowest (negative) between young women and old men (who
24begin to marry), the conditional dowries for all (i;j) combinations increase enough to raise
the average dowry. Note that the annual growth rate changed roughly from 0.01 to 0.02
between 1911 and 1971.
4. Dowry Conditional on Marriage Ages
As seen in the previous section, the eect on the equilibrium of a change in population
growth is quite complex, due to the various and possibly opposing eects at play. Even
if strategies do not change at all, the market moves into a new demographic steady-state
given by equations (2.1)-(2.4). Moreover, uniqueness of the matching equilibrium is not
guaranteed. But this problem can be sidestepped by directly comparing two equilibria by
their singles distributions (w;m;r). It will be shown that a market equilibrium with a
lower sex ratio r must have lower dowry payments between all matched couples. A similar
statement can be made for certain changes in w or m if the matching patterns in at least
one equilibrium are known.
This exercise does not deliver full comparative statics for an increase in g, and not all equi-
libria are comparable in this way. But the approach has the advantage that the equilibrium
value functions are unique given the singles distribution, so that unambiguous comparisons
are possible. Using demographic data from Karnataka it will be shown that the changes to
the singles distribution during the squeeze strongly suggest an increase in dowries.16
Recall that the dowry between i and j is given by
Dij = (1   )b(i;j)   g(i;j) + zj+1Gj+1   (1   )si+1Bi+1:
Suppose g changes and the market moves to a new equilibrium with a new d = (m;w;r).
For constant marriage payos and a given set of model parameters (;;), the change in
the transfer between i and j depends entirely on the eect on the value functions. Thus,
16Note also that the Indian census only provides age distributions (i.e. r, w, and m).
Vital registration (i.e. the collection of birth and mortality data) was only introduced with
the Sample Registration System in 1969-70, so that g, b, m and z are actually not directly
observed.
25showing that G must increase and/or B decrease is enough to prove that the dowry between
i and j must rise (and the reverse).
Dene the map Bd : [0;  G]J ! [0;  B]I such that for given d, Bd(G) is the women's value
function for xed G (equation (2.6)). Equivalently, let Gd : [0;  B] ! [0;  G]J be the solution
to equation (2.7) for given B. Note that in an equilibrium with d as the equilibrium singles
distribution and value functions (B;G), it must be that Bd(G) = B and Gd(B) = G.
Furthermore, for given d, B and G exist and are unique, as was assured by lemma 2.2.
Now suppose we know that for a second singles distribution d, Bd(G)  Bd(G)
and Gd(B)  Gd(B). This is enough to guarantee that the equilibrium value functions
B and G associated with d satisfy B  B and G  G. To show this, we use
Lemma 4.1. Given d, Bd is decreasing in G, and Gd is decreasing in B.
Proof Let ^ G  G. We want to show that B( ^ G)i  B(G)i for all i (suppressing the d
subscript).17 Thus, by contradiction suppose i is the highest age at which B( ^ G)i > B(G)i.
Let ^ ij be the optimal marriage decisions for ^ G and B( ^ G). But then
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Pi(j;d)^ ij[(i;j)   si+1B(G)i+1   zj+1Gj+1]
 B(G)i:
The rst inequality comes from the assumption on G and ^ G and the fact that we are looking
at the last age at which B( ^ G)i > B(G)i. The second inequality uses that ^  is not optimal
for G and B(G). Thus, we established the contradiction. The proof for G is identical.
This lemma allows the construction of two sequences Gn and Bn as follows:



















Provided (a) and (b) are true (by assumption), Bn is decreasing and Gn increasing, and
since both sequences are bounded, they converge to limit value functions B and G. It can
be shown that these limits are equilibrium value functions for the new d (see appendix),
and by lemma 2.2, they are the unique value functions. This implies B = B  B and
G = G  G.
Now all we need are conditions on d and d that actually make (a) and (b) hold.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose
(1) the singles sex ratio is higher in d than in d, and/or
(2) the women's age distribution in d shifts weight from ages i with higher (i;j)  
si+1B
i+1 to those with lower (i;j)   si+1B
i+1, compared to d.
Then the equilibrium value functions B and G for d are such that B  B and
G  G (with at least one strictly dierent if r > r in (1)), and dowry payments will
be higher under d for all couples who marry in both equilibria. An equivalent statement to
(2) holds for the men's side of the market.
The proof for each of these claims works in a similar manner as the proof for lemma 4.1 and
is in the appendix. Part (1) of the theorem means that the intuition about a \shortage"
of men holds; if the number of single men relative to single women falls, the dowry will
increase, because the outside value of search deteriorates for women but improves for men.
Part (2) builds on a similar argument: for a man at a given age j, a high (i;j) si+1Bi+1
is synonymous with a high net marriage surplus. If there are two equilibria with women's
age distributions w and w, and w \shifts" probability mass from high-surplus ages to
low-surplus ones compared to w, the value of search for men will be lower, and conditional
27dowries therefore smaller, under w. This result is particular useful if we know the matching
set (that is, A) in at least one of the equilibria, because we know for sure that (i;j)  
si+1Bi+1 must be lower outside j's matching set than inside. In particular, the search
value for men must fall if d shifts probability weight from the men's matching set under d
towards a set of ages i outside it. Formally, this becomes
Corollary 4.3. Let I be the union of all matching sets I(j) under w, and suppose w(i) 
w(i) for all i 2 I. Then the equilibrium value functions for d and d are such that
B  B and G  G.
4.1. Data and Implications for Conditional Dowries
Now I can use data from the Indian state Karnataka at the beginning and end of the
marriage squeeze to apply these results. As will be seen, theorem 4.2 and corollary 4.3
describe very closely how the singles distributions changed in Karnataka, with d the singles
distribution before the marriage squeeze and d afterwards: the singles sex ratio fell, and at
the same time, the age distribution of women after the squeeze puts more probability weight
on those age groups who marry, and therefore must have a high net marriage surplus.
Karnataka (Mysore) was chosen for several reasons. It is a large state in the South, where
marriages tend to be isogamous (between caste equals), so that any groom shortage is likely
demographic rather than due to the scarcity of high caste men (Caldwell et al. (1983), Billig
(1991)). Moreover, marriage age has been comparatively high for both sexes (Agarwala
(1957)) and legislation against child marriage was in place as early as 1894 (Marten (1923)).
These circumstances make it less likely that the change in marriage age was caused by
shifting age preferences e.g. due to higher rates of schooling. Finally, Mysore's location and
population composition (92% Hindu in 1931) imply that it was less aected by migration

ows after the partition of India in 1947 than other large states.18
18Like most states Mysore's borders were reorganized in 1956, but unlike many of them it
was not divided. Mysore was enlarged to include Coorg (Kodagu) and several neighboring
districts from Bombay, Hyderabad, and Madras (and renamed Karnataka in 1973). Since
the reorganization took place to align state boundaries with linguistic boundaries, I assume
28The analysis in this section and in the estimation of the next section must rely on two
assumptions. First, the marriage market before and after the squeeze must be in a steady
state.19 Figure 1 shows two plateaus in Karnataka's growth rate, between 1921 and 1941
and between 1961 and 1981. I will consider the census of 1971, supplemented by NFHS data
from all marriages between 19m63 and 1979, the \endpoint" of the marriage squeeze. The
choice of starting point is a little more problematic, since the 1941 census was not carried
out in full due to World War II, and 1901 and 1921 were preceded by famines and epidemics.
But the marriage age records in the census of 1931 may be distorted by the enactment of
the Child Marriage Restraint Act in April 1930, which outlawed a girl's marriage under 14
and a boy's under 18. Although there were no longterm eects, many parents seem to have
rushed to marry their children in 1929 and early 1930, leading to a one-time decrease in
marriage ages in many states in 1931 (see table 1). I will therefore use both the census data
from 1911 and from 1931 as approximations of the steady-state age distribution before the
marriage squeeze.
The second assumption is that marriage age preferences  are unchanged over the period
of the marriage squeeze. This is supported by the relative stagnation in economic growth
described earlier. Moreover, the total fertility rate was high throughout and did not ap-
preciably fall until after 1971 (5.75-5.86 in 1911-31, and 5.78 in 1966-71 Bhat (1989); Rele
(1987))), indicating that preferences over fertility timing and therefore marriage age did likely
not change substantially either. Finally, educational attainment { as a potential shifter for
marriage age preferences { was still low in 1971, with a female literacy rate below 19% (Indi-
aStat (2009)).20 Nonetheless, if families in 1971 preferred a higher marriage age for women
that Mysore's demographics are representative for the geographic area of today's Karnataka.
The marriage age estimates for both geographic areas in table 1 are quite similar.
19Or well-described by a steady-state equilibrium, e.g. because individuals have adaptive
expectations.
20Evidence from Bangladesh even suggests that the correlation between marriage age and
schooling is the result of parents taking their daughters out of school as soon as they reach
menarche, so that the preferred marriage age determines length of schooling rather than the
other way around (Ambrus and Field (2008)).







































































































































































than in 1931 or 1911, the assumption of constant age preferences may somewhat overstate
the pressure on the women's market side from marriage delays caused by the squeeze.
The data that used here and in the next section consists of the census counts from 1911,
1931, and 1971 of the numbers of never married and all men and women by age group
(Padmanabha (1973), Gait (1913), Hutton (1933)), and of survey data from the National
Family Health Survey (NFHS). The census provides the singles distributions. For the 1971
singles distribution, the adjusted total age returns of the census were combined with the data
for marital status by age, by multiplying the proportion of never married individuals in the
unadjusted age group total with the adjusted age group total by gender (see appendix on
the use of adjusted data). The NFHS data contains three survey waves from 1992 to 2006 of
women between 15 and 45 years of age. Each woman reports her age, her partner's age, and
the date of marriage. Figure 3 shows a (jittered) scatter plot of the marriage ages of women
and their partners for all weddings that took place between 1963 and 1979. The nal data
set has 3301 marriages with average date 1973.3.21 In most marriages, the husband is older
than the wife. While some people married under ten years, women marry mostly between
13 and 20 years and men between 16 and 30 years of age.
21Note that the sample is not representative of a given cohort or year, see below.
30Table 3. Sex Ratio and Rates of Permanent Celibacy, Karnataka
Ratio of single % never married
men to women (^ r) men women
Ages 2-49/2-29 20-29/10-19 all ages 50-55 30-35
1911 1.516 0.652 1.444 3.3 2.0
1931 1.529 0.647 1.440 2.0 1.4
1971 1.336 0.518 1.291 1.6 1.3
Census of India, 1901-1931, 1971, 1981.
Table 3 lists Karnataka's singles sex ratio ^ r over time. I assume that both men and women
enter the marriage market at age 2 and leave it at I = 29 and J = 49, re
ecting the minimal
and maximal marriage ages in the NFHS. Due to this unequal choice there are more single
men than women; what matters for the argument here, however, is that both in 1911 and in
1931 the observed singles sex ratio ^ r is more than 0.18 points higher than in 1971, implying
that men's market conditions improved substantially. By theorem 4.2, the steep decline of
the singles sex ratio during the squeeze predicts an increase in conditional dowries, driven by
lower meeting rates of women. The singles sex ratios for dierent age ranges in the second
and third column conrm that the eect is robust. The table also lists the proportion of
never married men aged 50-55 and women aged 30-35, showing that, just as in India as a
whole, the proportion of men and women who do not marry is very small and has changed
little throughout.
Figure 4 shows the histograms of the men's and women's singles distributions for 1911 and
1931 (averaged) and for 1971. The men's distribution exhibits only relatively small changes
between the beginning and end of the squeeze, especially when comparing the unadjusted
data. Moreover, most of the movement takes place before fteen years of age. The women's
singles age distribution, on the other hand, experienced a clear shift of probability mass
from the age groups 0-5 and 5-10 to 15-20 years. The NFHS data has shown that girls
rarely marry under the age of ten at the end of the marriage squeeze (1971 preferences). If
we accept that w71(i)  w31(i)(w11(i)) for all i 2 [15;20], and w71(i)  w31(i)(w11(i)) for
31Figure 4. Women's and men's age distributions, average of 1911 and 1931 vs. 1971.
i 2 [10;15], then corollary 4.3 applies, suggesting that dowries conditional on partners' ages
have increased from 1911/31 to 1971.
Together, we have
Observation 4.4. At the end of the marriage squeeze, the singles sex ratio has declined, and
the women's singles age distribution puts more probability weight on women who actually
marry (and whose net marriage surplus is therefore higher). Theorem 4.2 and corollary 4.3
therefore imply that conditional dowries have increased.
Observation 4.4 draws a rst important conclusion about the eect of demographic change
on dowries. The conditional dowry is a direct re
ection of men's and women's relative value
of participating in the marriage market. If that value declines for women and rises for men,
surplus is redistributed from the women's to the men's side. The conditional dowry increase
is equivalent to an increase in the price of marriage for women for a given match quality.
Importantly, this would even hold if average dowries had at the same time decreased due to
a change in the composition of observed marriages.
The eect of demographic change on average dowries, as well as on marriage ages, is of
equal interest, but cannot be derived from this result alone. To quantify these eects and
determine if the marriage squeeze has caused an in
ation in average dowries I estimate the
model in the next section.
325. GMM Estimation: Average Dowry and Marriage Age
In what follows I will employ the 1971 data for a minimum-distance estimate of the payo
function , and then use the estimated ^  and the data from 1911 and 1931 to calculate the
value functions and marriage strategies from before the marriage squeeze. The results are
used to compare average dowries and marriage ages before and after. As before, it must
be assumed that the market is in a steady-state and that preferences are the same before
and after the marriage squeeze. An advantage of the estimation is that it can account for
changes in mortality, whereas the previous section only assumed a change in g. While the
dierences are small { most mortality improvements happened for children under 5 years of
age { this aspect of demographic change can now also be part of the analysis.22
5.1. Demographic variables and moments for the estimation
The estimation uses two sets of moments, from the NFHS and from the 1971 census. The
time period of the model is assumed to be one year. The moments from the NFHS are the
numbers of women at age i who married a man at age j as a proportion of all women who
were at age i between 1963 and 1979. If there was no attrition, these proportions would
be representative even if the numbers of women at each age in the combined data set are
not. However, since the NFHS is retrospective, it is biased by the fact that older women
or women who married old husbands are more likely to be widowed or deceased before the
survey takes place. To correct for this bias, each woman's observation is weighed by the
inverse of the probability of death of husband and wife between the marriage date and the
survey date, calculated again from the UN lifetables. The data is then grouped by the same
age intervals as the census to yield moments
^ M = f ^ Mk;lg for k = 2   4;5   9;:::;25   29 and l = 2   4;5   9;:::;45   49:
The second set of moments is the counterpart to the singles distribution. Denote by ^ dx(k)
the proportion of sex x 2 ff;mg individuals at age k, and by ^ dm the proportion of men in
22Mortality under age 1 and at ages 1-4 both halved. From age 5 on, the probability of
dying decreased by 0.02 in each 5-year age interval; this is an about 0.2% higher per-period
chance of dying.
33the overall singles population. The empirical moments are
^ d = f^ df(2); ^ df(3); ^ df(4); ^ df(5 9); ::: ^ df(20 24); ^ dm(2); ^ dm(3); ^ dm(4); ^ dm(5 9); ::: ^ dm(40 44); ^ dmg:
All demographic parameters of the model are derived from total census population counts
and from the UN life tables (appendix B). First, consider the equivalent of equations (2.1) and
(2.2) for the female and male total populations. Assuming a population steady state, ^ si =
si
1+g
is given by the ratio of ^ wi= ^ wi 1, where ^ wi is the proportion of the total female population at
age i, so from the total population counts I can derive ^ s and ^ z for all ages.23 Alternatively,
the annual probabilities of survival can be derived from the life tables. Assuming that
the mortality rate within each 5-year age group is constant, si for each age is given by
(1  10q5)0:2.24 The ^ s and ^ z are used in the estimation algorithm to calculate the steady-
state singles distribution, and s and z enter the value functions. Since g =
si
^ si   1, the
two alternative derivations can be used to calculate the average implied annual growth rate,
yielding 1.43 and 1.45 percent for 1911 and 1931, and 2.33% for 1971. This is approximately
consistent with the population growth rates from the census. Finally, the birth sex ratio and
survival rates until market entry b
z0
s0 are obtained from the empirical singles distribution,






s0 is calculated in this way it equals 1.039 in
1971).
5.2. Estimation assumptions and procedure
The marriage payo function is parameterized as
(i;j) = C + p1i + p2i
2 + p3j + p4j
2 + p5ij;
where C is a constant. The functional form implies that age preferences depend quadratically
on the age of the wife and husband. At the same time, the optimal marriage age of one
23For grouped age categories I solve for a constant multiplier, e.g. ^ s5 to ^ s9 solve ^ w(5 9) =
^ s
1 ^ s(1   ^ s5)^ w4.
24The notation nqx refers to the proportion of individuals who will die in the x-year age
interval beginning at n. It is throughout assumed that mortality is independent from marital
status, a simplication given maternal mortality.
34partner clearly depends on that of the other (e.g. on their age dierence). This is captured
by parameter p5. If this parameter is positive partners' ages are complements. Note that
marriage strategies, determined by S(i;j), are invariant to linear transformations of  and
(B;G). The constant C and parameters p are therefore identied up to the sign of C. C is
set to  10, amounting to the assumption that the payo from remaining single at 30 and
50, respectively, is higher than that of marrying at ages (2;2).
Identication for the parameters comes from two sources. First, the probability of marry-
ing at i determines 'i, or the change in the age distribution w between i and i+1. The same
holds for the men's side; the \size" of the set of i that j marries determines  j. These are
given by the empirical moments ^ d. At the same time, the exact \location" of this set within
ages 1;:::;I is determined by marriage behavior, observed in the ^ M. Given the man's age
j, the shape of his matching set depends on the woman's age through p1 + p5j and p2 (and
his outside option). Conversely, the women's matching sets are determined by p3, p5i and
p4. Note that the parameters are identied only up to a small neighborhood around them,
because the model is discrete: in a pure strategy equilibrium, an  variation of the payo
function around a given set of parameters will have no eect on marriage decisions, so the
moments are the same. But marriage probabilities and marriage ages are unaected by this,
and checks on the results show that varying the estimated parameter vector ^ p within the
relevant range (<  0.0001) has a negligible eect on average dowry payments calculated
from the estimates.
The Nash bargaining parameter is set to  = 0:5, and the discount factor to  = 0:9596.25
The meeting rates w and m are assumed to take the following form:
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> > > <
> > > :








r; m =  1 p
r else
for  = 0:8. In eect there is a \base" meeting rate of 0.8, which is then modulated
symmetrically by the square root of r (or the inverse of r). With this formulation, the 
functions are continuous and symmetric for any r 2 [0:64;1:5625].
25 = 1
1+r where r is the annual redemption yield of government of India securities.
35The choice of functional form and the other assumptions were made with a view to making
the model as symmetric as possible. This may not be entirely accurate with respect to the
realities of the Indian marriage market, but it ensures that any asymmetry in the results,
especially in marriage transfers, is not introduced articially.
The estimation routine proceeds by guessing parameters p and nding the equilibrium
matching set and age distributions. Given parameters p and a singles distribution, the value
functions B and G are unique and can be found by iteration (lemma 2.2). With the empirical
singles distribution (^ m; ^ w; ^ r) as a starting point, the algorithm calculates the (unique) value
functions and an initial matching matrix A. This matrix, together with the exogenous
demographic parameters and the  functions, is used to iterate over m and w to nd a new
steady state singles distribution using equations (2.1)-(2.4). From here on the process is
repeated until the matching matrix converges.26 The resulting equilibrium age distribution
(m;w;r) and matching matrix A are used to calculate the theoretical moments fM;dg. The
objective function is given by
(^ V   V )
0(^ V   V )
with ^ V and V the stacked vectors of moments (^ d; ^ M) and (d;M).27
The resulting estimate ^ p can then be used for counterfactuals. With demographic infor-
mation on g, s and z for 1911 and 1931, the same algorithm as above is applied to nd
the value functions and equilibrium singles distributions for these years. Note that the only
sources of exogenous change between 1911/1931 and 1971 are the dierent growth rate and
mortalities that the marriage market is subjected to before and after the marriage squeeze,
26Since I have not formally shown that m an w are contractions, it is in theory possible
that there are several steady-state singles distributions, but in practice the routine converges
reliably. In addition, despite potential multiplicity of equilibria, with dierent starting age
distributions the procedure always converged to the same equilibrium. The program can be
extended to allow for mixed equilibria, but due to computing capacity limits I restrict the
search to pure-strategy equilibria.
27A unity weighting matrix was chosen after a two-step procedure to get empirical (vari-
ance) weights proved too time-consuming.
36Table 4. Estimation Results: Parameters of 
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
Est. -0.257 -0.161 1.618 -0.083 0.254
CI 95% (-0.279 -0.131) (-0.193 -0.117) (1.326 1.908) (-0.100 -0.060) (0.194 0.301)
CI: 95% condence intervals from bootstrapping procedure.
Figure 5. Payo function  for   0.
embodied in s, z, ^ s and ^ z. To account for the sampling variance of the estimates, I use a
bootstrap procedure to draw new samples from the NFHS data and repeat the estimation
for those (using the unchanged census data each time). In the results below I report the
95% condence intervals obtained from the bootstrap.
5.3. Results
The parameter estimates are reported in table 4. Figure 5 depicts the resulting payo
function. Observe that the age of the woman by itself has a negative eect on the marriage
payo, but the interaction term p5 makes the overall eect positive as long as the man is at
least about a third older than her. The man's age positively aects marriage payos.
Table 5 reports the calculated marriage ages and dowries from the estimation (1971) and
the counterfactuals (1911 and 1931). The top half of the table gives the mean ages and
average age gap at marriage as calculated from the equilibria under ^ . The last column
reports the absolute change of the marriage age dierence from 1911 and 1931 to 1971.
According to the estimates the age gap at marriage has signicantly fallen from the beginning
to the end of the squeeze, from 8.26 (8.28) to 7.87 years, with an absolute change of 0.39
37Table 5. Estimation Results: Dowries and Marriage Ages
Marriage age women men dierence abs. change to '71
1911 16.736 24.998 8.262 -0.388
(16.459 17.800) (24.343 25.754) (7.757 8.265) (-0.519 -0.166)
1931 16.775 25.055 8.280 -0.406
(16.521 17.862) (24.398 25.895) (7.779 8.285) (-0.649 -0.153)
1971 17.583 25.457 7.874 -
(17.441 18.625) (25.128 26.169) (7.253 7.874)
(Sekher et al. 1971) 17.79 25.24 7.45 -
Dowries average lowest highest % change to '71
1911 8.678 -2.386 11.629 0.209
(5.512 14.92) (-3.104 -2.011) (8.560 19.732) (0.165 0.479)
1931 8.601 -2.446 11.603 0.22
(5.498 14.771) (-3.176 -2.076) (8.555 19.653) (0.170 0.483)
1971 10.496 -1.856 13.245 -
(8.039 18.002) (-2.366 -1.507) (10.188 22.537)
95% condence intervals from bootstrapping procedure in parentheses.
(0.41) years. The decrease comes about partly because women delay marriage, and partly
because men marry slightly earlier. The last line reproduces the Sekher et al. estimates of
male and female marriage ages in small print, showing that my estimates match their results
closely.28
The estimation does not replicate the full increase in marriage age for women, and con-
sequently it also does not capture the entire change in the age dierence at marriage. One
28Note that their marriage ages are estimated from the numbers of married and unmarried
individuals in every age group as reported in the census. The census assumes that all children
under ten are unmarried, while according to the NFHS 2.2 percent of women and 0.5 percent
of husbands were under 10 at their wedding.
38possible reason for the discrepancy is that the present model does not account for widower
remarriage. As Bhat and Halli (1999) point out, women in India remain usually unmarried
after the death of their husbands, whereas men often remarry, potentially inducing an ad-
ditional marriage squeeze when women's mortality declines and fewer widowers return to
the marriage market. In 1971, very few men are widowed before their 50s, so this is not an
important factor in the marriage market. Before the squeeze, the death of a spouse is more
likely; here the number of widowers adds about 4% to the overall number of single men up to
age 50. But this is still a fairly small share of the market, and widowerhood is a rare event
even then.29 The results might therefore indicate that the marriage age gap was reduced by
the squeeze, but that there was an additional upward shift in women's marriage age due to
other factors.
The lower half of the table reports the calculations for dowries. The rst three columns
show the average dowry paid in a given year and the minimal and maximal payments between
dierent age pairings (i;j). Interestingly, positive and negative payments (brideprices) co-
exist, depending on the partners' ages. This is consistent with anecdotal reports on dowries.
Since the estimated dowries are expressed in utility units, which are only informative in
relative terms, the last column reports the percentage change in average dowries from 1911
and 1931 to 1971. There is a signicant increase in the average dowry of about 20% in
real terms. Assuming that utility is linear in money, we can use the net dowries paid in
Karnataka marriages between 1963 and 1979 in the NCAER data set, and the total income
of those same 119 households, to gauge the size of the change. The average dowry for those
marriages was Rs. 23,212, and their mean annual household income at the time of the survey
29In the model used here,  re
ects the present value of all payos during marriage, and
the model remains approximately accurate if there is the possibility of remarriage, but the
probability of being widowed is very low. To estimate an equilibrium where remarriage is
likely, the model must specify in addition when the marriage payos actually occur, and the
present value has to take in account payos in the current marriage as well as the possibility
of the partner's death and a return into the marriage market.
39Rs. 21,486 (both in 1984 Rs.). The estimation would then imply that the average dowry has
increased from 89% to 108% of annual household income.
Besides dowry and marriage ages, one may want to compare overall welfare between the
two equilibria and assess the welfare loss due to search frictions. Table 6 shows the value of
search at market entry, given by B0 and G0, as well as the average value of search per person
for each new generation, using that the number of men at age 1 equals b
z0
s0 times the number
of women at age 1. The table also reports the social planner expected payos and optimal
marriage ages (the combination (i;j) which maximizes the average expected payo). This
is calculated in a similar manner as the expected average per-person value of marriage, but
assuming there is a social planner who can decree that all men and women marry at the
payo-maximizing ages. The payo to marriage at birth if all couples marry at ages (i;j)
is 0:5qwi(i;j) for a woman and 0:5qwi(i;j) for a man, where qw and qm represent the
individual woman's or man's probability of marriage. Using the growth rate 0.0233 from
above for 1971 (0.0143 for 1911 and 0.0145 for 1931) and the relationship M1 = b
z0
s0W1, the
ratio between men and women at each age combination can be calculated, and assuming
that all on the short side of the market marry, this provides the probability of marriage for
the other side.
The table shows that the marriage squeeze reduces the value of search for women by
at least 14%, while it raises that for men by 26% or more. The highly benecial eect of
demographic change for men, induced by delayed marriage and a weaker market position for
women, means that the average per-person value actually increases.
Under a social planner regime, marriage ages would be much higher than they actually
are. The optimal age gap would still be large, but it optimally decreases slightly under
the marriage squeeze to keep women's probability of marriage high. As a consequence, the
maximal possible per-person social surplus is almost unchanged by the marriage squeeze.
The comparison between actual and social-planner payos (assuming no transfers) reveals
that the search frictions induce not only a large reduction in welfare, but also a substantial
redistribution of marriage payos from women to men. This means that men benet from
the search frictions and the resulting high dowry payments, whereas women would prefer
40Table 6. Welfare comparison.
Value of search Social planner solution
B G avg. p.p. marr. ages qw exp. payo women men avg. p.p.
1911 2.28 6.59 4.36 (29,42) 0.77 9.20 6.96 8.12
1931 2.34 6.57 4.39 (29,42) 0.78 9.32 6.96 8.17
1971 1.96 8.33 5.21 (29,40) 0.81 9.04 7.12 8.07
a social planner regime despite lower marriage rates, highlighting the pressure on women
brought on by the greater urgency of their search.
6. Conclusion
This paper developed a model of the marriage market in India and analyzed its predic-
tions for the change in dowries and marriage ages during the marriage squeeze. The model
assumes that marriage preferences depend on the partners' ages, and that there are frictions
in the search for a marriage partner. Within this framework, the changes to the singles
distribution as a consequence of the squeeze imply increased dowries conditional on age. In
addition, the estimation results suggest that average dowries have risen as well, while the
age gap at marriage has decreased at the same time. These results do not rule out possible
other (additional) reasons for the observed changes, but they lend strong support to the
hypothesis that both marriage age changes and dowry in
ation in India were caused in part
by demographic change. The adverse welfare eects of the marriage squeeze on women can
explain the universal perception of increased pressure on their side of the market and the
renewed urgency of the dowry debate in 1960-80, leading to the Dowry Prohibition Act in
1961 and the insertion of a marital cruelty act with specic reference to dowry harassment
into the criminal code in 1983 (IPC 498A).
Population growth in India leveled o in the 1980's and has since begun to decline.
Moreover, the sex ratio is shifting due to the greater availability of abortion and the use of
sex selection in favor of boys (e.g. Almond and Edlund (2008)). The same development has
been observed in other countries with a strong preference for sons, notably China, which
41is today experiencing a serious shortage of women (Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1997)). We
would consequently expect dowries to halt their rise, and the available data supports that
conjecture. In addition, the age gap at marriage may eventually stabilize or begin to increase
again.
However, as long as \an older unmarried daughter is a tremendous misfortune with large
social and economic costs" (Bloch and Rao (2002)), the overall demand for husbands in India
will be inelastic to prices, and dowries will be susceptible to demographic shocks. The link
between marriage squeeze, dowry in
ation, and age preferences therefore implies a continued
role for public policy. The Dowry Prohibition Act, dicult to enforce, had little eect on
the dowry practice, suggesting that eorts to abolish dowry might be more successful if
they focus on altering rigid age and marriage preferences and giving women options that are
independent of their traditional role as wives.
On a more general level, the ndings of this paper emphasize the very important role
that age preferences and demographics play for the marriage market. Their powers came
to bear particularly strongly in India, which has seen extraordinary demographic change
in a comparatively short time span, but the eects of demographic imbalance can be seen
elsewhere as well, for example in increased savings by parents of sons in China (Wei and
Zhang (2011)) and in the lower partner quality for women in France after WWI (Abramitzky
et al. (2011)). India's dowry problem thus highlights a force in the marriage market that
has only recently received renewed attention from economists.
42Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Let X = [0;  B]I  [0;  G]J with the sup norm, and dene a map
T : X ! X so that
T(B;G)i = si+1Bi+1 +
J X
j=1
Pijij [(i;j)   si+1Bi+1   zj+1Gj+1]; i = 1;:::;I; and
T(B;G)I+j = zj+1Gj+1 +
I X
i=1
Qjiij [(i;j)   si+1Bi+1   zj+1Gj+1]; j = 1;:::;J
Consider two sets of value functions (B;G) and ( ^ B; ^ G) in X, and let ij denote a positive net
marriage surplus for B and G. Dene  = maxfmaxi jBi   ^ Bij;maxj jGj   ^ Gjjg. Without
loss of generality, assume that T(B;G)i  T( ^ B; ^ G)(i). It must be that





(i;j)   si+1 ^ Bi+1   zj+1 ^ Gj+1
i
;
since  describes the optimal behavior for B and G, not ^ B and ^ G. Thus,














si+1(Bi+1   ^ Bi+1) +
J X
j=1
Pijijzj+1( ^ Gj+1   Gj+1)
< :
The last inequality holds since the eective discount factor is less than 1. The map T is a
contraction, and has a unique xed point (Banach). 















(using that z1 = s1). The lower

















. Let Ln be the unit simplex of dimension n. We can now dene





J)  Sr  [0;1]
IJ
43as the space in which the age distributions (w;m;r) and matrices A live. It is closed,
bounded, and convex.
Dene F : X ! X on that space as follows. Fi for i = 1;:::;I is given by the right-
hand side of equations 2.3 and 2.1, and FI+j for j = 1;:::;J is described by equations 2.2
and 2.4. FI+J+1 is the right-hand side of 2.5. In other words, the rst I + J + 1 terms
of F just create new singles distributions from given w, m and r and strategy matrix A.
The remaining I  J terms of F are the new marriage indicators, obtained from the {
by lemma 2.2 unique { value functions for d. F is single-valued, except at points where
(i;j)   si+1Bi+1   zj+1Gj+1 = 0, where ij can take values between 0 and 1. The image
of a point in X under F is non-empty, closed, and convex, and F is upper hemi-continuous,
since P and Q are continuous. The map therefore has a xed point, and this xed point
constitutes a marriage market equilibrium. 
Proof of Claim p. 27: It must be shown that limn Bn equals Bd(G), or equivalently
that limBd(Gn) = Bd(limGn). In the remainder of the proof, the d index is suppressed
for better readability.
The proof is by induction on i. First, note that limB(Gn)I+1 = B(G)(I+1 = 0. The













Pijmax[0;(i;j)   si+1B(G)i+1   zj+1Gj+1)] = B(G)i:
Proof of Theorem 4.2: In view of the previous results, to prove (1) it only needs to be
shown that Br(G)  Br(G) and Gr(B)  Gr(B) for r < r, with one of the two strict.
The proof is very similar to that of lemma 4.1. Fix G and observe that w(r) < w(r). We
want to show that Br(G)i < Br(G)i for all i. By contradiction, suppose i is the highest
age at which Br(G)i > Br(G)i. Let ^ ij be the optimal marriage decisions for Br(G). But
then






























w(r)mj^ ij[(i;j)   zj+1Gj+1]
 Br(G)i:
A similar argument holds for G if m(r) > m(r). Since r < r, one of the two must hold.
To show (2) it only needs to be shown that Gw(B)j  Gw(B)j for all j. By contradiction,
suppose j is the highest age at which Gw(B)j > Gw(B)j. Let ij be the optimal marriage


































ij[(i;j)   zj+1Gw(B)j+1   si+1Bi+1]
= Gw(B)j
The proof of Corollary 4.3 is similar to the proof for part (2) of theorem 4.2 and is omitted.
Appendix B. UN lifetables and adjusted census data
Using the life table, the development of each age group of the 1971 population can be
simulated and compared with the next higher age bracket. Assuming a steady state, the
simulated should be larger than the original population by roughly the same growth factor in
each age group. This is not the case, and could at rst blush indicate that the steady-state
assumption is faulty; however, comparing the 1971 census with that from 1981 shows that
within each age group growth lied between 1.7 and 3.4 percent annually in the 10 years,
45Table 7. Probability of dying per age interval (nqx)
1911/31 1971
age males females males females
0 0.2268 0.20275 0.12967 0.13704
1 0.20238 0.20976 0.09196 0.10603
5 0.04734 0.05278 0.02425 0.02927
10 0.01901 0.02254 0.01178 0.01351
15 0.02154 0.03321 0.01292 0.01824
20 0.0252 0.04043 0.01445 0.02275
25 0.03005 0.04178 0.01770 0.02708
30 0.03718 0.04697 0.02143 0.02922
35 0.04758 0.05044 0.02972 0.03170
40 0.06325 0.05583 0.04167 0.03722
45 0.08465 0.06743 0.06368 0.04994
50 0.11706 0.09613 0.09246 0.07305
55 0.15488 0.13962 0.13955 0.11337
60 0.21659 0.20267 0.19527 0.16724
65 0.29286 0.27633 0.26502 0.24393
Sources: 1911-31: model lifetables from United Nations (1982), life expectancy at birth 35
yrs. 1971: lifetable for India 1971-76 (United Nations (1986)).
reasonably close to a constant growth rate. This suggests that there is age misreporting, a
fact also acknowledged in the census documentation. The estimation therefore uses adjusted
age data as supplied by the census, which gives a more consistent picture for the population
development between 1971 and 1981.
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